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Financial Markets Equilibrium with
Heterogeneous Agents
Jaksˇa Cvitanic´∗, Elye`s Jouini†, Semyon Malamud‡and Clotilde Napp§
December 3, 2009
Abstract
This paper presents an equilibrium model in a pure exchange econ-
omy when investors have three possible sources of heterogeneity. In-
vestors may differ in their beliefs, in their level of risk aversion and in
their time preference rate. We study the impact of investors hetero-
geneity on the properties of the equilibrium. In particular, we analyze
the consumption shares, the market price of risk, the risk free rate,
the bond prices at different maturities, the stock price and volatil-
ity as well as the stock’s cumulative returns, and optimal portfolio
strategies. We relate the heterogeneous economy with the family of
associated homogeneous economies with only one class of investors.
We consider cross sectional as well as asymptotic properties.
Keywords: equilibrium, heterogeneous agents, volatility, optimal
portfolios, survival, yield curve, long yield
JEL Classification. D53, G11, G12
1 Introduction
This paper presents an equilibrium model in a pure exchange economy when
investors have three possible sources of heterogeneity. Investors may differ in
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their beliefs, in their level of risk aversion and in their time preference rate.
We study the impact of investors heterogeneity on the equilibrium properties.
The present paper is the first to deal with the three aspects of hetero-
geneity simultaneously, which enables us to better identify the impact of
heterogeneity and its determinants. We analyze agents interactions, and the
impact of heterogeneity at the individual level, in particular on individual
consumption, individual valuations, individual portfolio holdings and risk
sharing rules. At the aggregate level, we analyze properties of the market
price of risk, of the risk free rate, of the bond prices, and of the stock price
and volatility. We compare equilibrium characteristics to the characteristics
in the homogeneous economies populated by one class of agents only. We
consider cross sectional as well as asymptotic properties.
Heterogeneity implies that investors value differently the states of the
world. Individual valuations of the states of the world are reflected by indi-
vidual Arrow-Debreu prices, i.e., the Arrow-Debreu prices that would prevail
in the economy populated by one type of agents only. For example, a pes-
simistic agent values more than an optimistic agent the states of the world
where the level of aggregate consumption is low (or the Arrow-Debreu assets
associated to those bad states), as she assigns a higher probability to those
states. Analogously, a more risk averse agent values more than a less risk
averse agent the states of the world with a low level of aggregate consump-
tion. Finally, a more patient agent values more the states of the world in
the distant future. More generally, the exact mixture of those heterogeneous
individual parameters of beliefs, risk aversion and time preference determines
individual valuations.
We analyze how heterogeneous individual valuations impact the equilib-
rium valuation, i.e., the Arrow-Debreu prices. We first obtain that if individ-
ual Arrow-Debreu prices are decreasing in aggregate endowment, then the
equilibrium Arrow-Debreu price at the aggregate level is also decreasing in
aggregate endowment. At all dates and in all states of the world, the Arrow-
Debreu price lies in the range bounded by the minimum individual Arrow-
Debreu price and the maximum individual Arrow-Debreu price. When a
given individual Arrow-Debreu price dominates the others, then it governs
the equilibrium Arrow-Debreu price at the aggregate level. This means that
when a class of agents values much more than the others an Arrow-Debreu
asset, that class drives the market for that asset. We find that in “extreme”
states of the world (very high or very low level of aggregate endowment,
in the distant future), one agent dominates individual valuations of Arrow-
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Debreu assets. This “dominating” agent is not the same asymptotically, in
very good or in very bad states of the world. Distinct classes of agents drive
the price of the different Arrow-Debreu assets.
We find that for very high (low) level of aggregate endowment, the equi-
librium Arrow-Debreu price is determined by the agent with the highest
(lowest) individual market price of risk where the individual market price of
risk is defined as the market price of risk that would prevail in an economy
populated by one class of agents only1. For example, if there is heterogeneity
in beliefs (risk aversion levels) only, the equilibrium Arrow-Debreu price for
very low levels of aggregate consumption is given by the Arrow-Debreu price
of the most pessimistic (most risk averse) agent. That agent is the one who
values the most the Arrow-Debreu asset associated to these “bad” states.
We show that in the distant future the agent with the lowest survival index2
(Yan, 2008) governs the Arrow-Debreu price. In the case with heterogeneity
in beliefs (time preference) only, this agent is the most rational (patient)
agent.
As for consumption, an agent consumes relatively more in the states of the
world that she finds relatively more desirable, as her individual Arrow-Debreu
price is higher, and so is her individual consumption. As a consequence, the
results about the Arrow-Debreu prices can be applied to the consumption
shares. In particular, only the class of agents with the highest market price
of risk (lowest market price of risk, lowest survival index) dominates the
market in the sense of the consumption share in very bad states of the world
(in very good states of the world, asymptotically). We also retrieve the result
of Yan (2008) that only the agent with the lowest survival index survives in
the long run.
Fluctuations across time and states of the world in the individual con-
sumptions and hence in the individual risk tolerance levels3 generate fluc-
1The individual market price of risk of agent i is given by θi = γiσ− δi where γi, δi and
σ respectively denote the individual level of risk aversion, the individual level of optimism
and the volatility of aggregate endowment. The individual (required) market price of risk
reflects the agent’s motives to invest in a risky asset. It increases with the level of risk
aversion and with the level of pessimism.
2The survival index of agent i is defined by κi ≡ ρi+γi(µ− σ22 )+ 12δ2i , where ρi, γi, δi, µ
and σ respectively denote the individual level of time preference, risk aversion, optimism
and the drift and volatility of aggregate endowment.
3Letting cit denote the individual equilibrium consumption level of agent i, the individ-
ual consumption share of agent i is defined by citPN
j=1 cjt
. The relative level of absolute risk
3
tuations in the behavior at the aggregate level (beliefs, risk aversion and
patience). Indeed, the aggregate parameters can be written as a risk tol-
erance weighted average of the individual parameters. We obtain time and
state varying levels of risk aversion, optimism and patience at the aggre-
gate level even though the individual levels of risk aversion, optimism and
patience are constant. This generates at the aggregate level waves of pes-
simism/optimism, of risk aversion and of patience. For example, in bad states
of the world, more pessimistic agents have a higher consumption share and a
higher relative level of risk tolerance, which leads to a pessimistic bias at the
aggregate level. Without referring to irrational behavior, this can explain ex-
cess of pessimism in periods of recession. Analogously, we get that more risk
averse agents have a higher weight in the economy in periods of recession,
which leads to more risk aversion at the aggregate level. This is interest-
ing in relation to Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008), who show that individual
risk aversion is not time varying even though fluctuating (and in particular
countercyclical) risk aversion, as in habit preference models (Campbell and
Cochrane, 1999), would help matching aggregate data.
The market price of risk is the risk tolerance weighted average of the
individual market prices of risk. While the individual market prices of risk are
constant in time and state of the world, the equilibrium market price of risk in
the heterogeneous economy fluctuates in time and state of the world between
the two bounds which are the lowest individual market price of risk and the
highest individual market price of risk. If one class of agents dominates the
level of risk tolerance, then the market price of risk in the heterogeneous
economy is dominated by their market price of risk. Applying the results
on the risk tolerance, we get that for very high (low) levels of aggregate
consumption, the market price of risk is given by the lowest (highest) market
price of risk, and that the market price of risk converges asymptotically to
the market price of risk of the surviving agent. For example, when there
is heterogeneity in beliefs only, the most pessimistic agents dominate the
economy for low levels of aggregate endowment leading to the highest market
price of risk.
Moreover, we obtain that the market price of risk is countercyclical: the
higher the aggregate endowment the lower the market price of risk. This
result is quite striking, since it holds for any distribution of the parame-
tolerance of agent i is given by ωit ≡ − u
′
i
u′′i
(cit)
[∑− u′iu′′i (cit)]−1 = (1/γi)citPNj=1(1/γj)cjt , where γi
denotes the risk aversion level of agent i.
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ters of risk aversion and beliefs. It is heterogeneity and its impact on the
fluctuations of the relative levels of risk tolerance which generates this coun-
tercyclical behavior; indeed, an increase in aggregate endowment leads to
higher relative levels of risk tolerance for the agents with a high market price
of risk. This countercyclicality property is consistent with observations that
“equity risk premia seem to be higher at business troughs than they are at
peaks” (Campbell and Cochrane, 1999).
Contrary to the market price of risk, the risk free rate is not a weighted
average of the individual risk free rates4. In general the equilibrium charac-
teristics in the heterogeneous economy (with N classes of agents) are fun-
damentally different from the equilibrium characteristics in a homogeneous
economy. The equilibrium risk free rate can lie outside the range bounded
by the lowest individual risk free rate and by the highest individual risk free
rate. However, in “extreme” states of the world, the risk free rate behaves
as a risk tolerance weighted average of the individual ones: the risk free rate
for very high (low) levels of aggregate endowment is given by the individual
risk free rate of the agent with the lowest (highest) market price of risk and
the asymptotic risk free rate is given by the risk free rate of the surviving
agent.
The equilibrium long term bond yield is given by the individual long
term bond yield of the agent with the highest savings motives (lowest indi-
vidual risk free rate). The reasoning is the same as for the Arrow-Debreu
assets: when a given class of agents has an individual price for an asset that
dominates the other individual prices, then that class of agents governs the
equilibrium price in the heterogeneous economy. The agent with the highest
savings motives values the most (very) long term bonds. Hence, the individ-
ual zero-coupon bond price of that agent asymptotically dominates the other
individual bond prices. The agent with the highest savings motives hence
governs the long term bond yield in the heterogeneous economy.
Note that the agent with the highest savings motives differs from the
agent with the lowest survival index. It is quite striking that the agent who
drives the asymptotic long term bond yield differs from the agent who drives
the asymptotic risk free rate even though the bond yield is an average of the
4The individual risk free rate is the risk free rate that would prevail if the economy
was populated by one agent only. The individual risk free rate of agent i is given by
ri = ρi + γi (µ+ δi) − 12γi (γi + 1)σ2, where ρi, γi, δi, µ and σ respectively denote the
individual level of time preference, risk aversion, the individual level of optimism, the drift
and the volatility of aggregate endowment.
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risk free rates. In particular, in the long run, the yield curve is driven by the
risk free rate of the agent with the lowest survival index at one end of the yield
curve, whereas at the other end, it is driven by the risk free rate of the agent
with the highest savings motives or equivalently the lowest risk free rate. In
fact we show that for times t far in the future, there are distinct time periods
during which distinct agents drive the long term bond yield as seen from time
t. The (asymptotic) yield curve is defined stepwise, and each subinterval is
associated with a given agent in the sense that the marginal rate on that
subinterval corresponds to the rate in the economy made of this agent only.
The same reasoning as for the Arrow-Debreu assets and the long term bond
still holds since the agent who makes the market of the zero coupon bond on
the considered subinterval is the agent who values the most this zero coupon
bond. She is characterized by a maximization program involving a weighted
average of the savings motives index and of the survival index. In the short
run, the whole weight is on the savings motives index and in the long run, the
whole weight is on the survival index. In between, the agent who governs the
asymptotic yield curve maximizes a trade off between the savings motives
and survival. For example, when there is only heterogeneity in beliefs, one
end of the asymptotic yield curve is dominated by the most rational agent
(maximization of the survival motives), the other end is dominated by the
most pessimistic agent (maximization of the savings motives) and in the
middle, the asymptotic yield curve is governed, in intervals, by more and
more pessimistic agents (maximization of a trade off between rationality and
pessimism). Note that in this setting, only pessimistic agents impact the
asymptotic yield curve.
These results are in line with Preferred Habitat Theory (Modigliani and
Sutch, 1966), in which each agent has a preferred habitat corresponding to
her natural investment horizon. In our framework, this investment horizon
naturally emerges for each agent, as the result of heterogeneity.
This implies in particular that survival and long run impact are different
concepts. We are in a setting where only the agent with the lowest survival
index survives (and has an impact on prices in the sense of Kogan et al.,
2008), however non surviving agents do have an impact on asset prices, even
in the long run. In the case of the yield curve, one may argue that this
impact is at more and more distant horizons, but we also provide examples
where the impact of non surviving agents does not vanish asymptotically. As
far as risky assets are concerned, we also show that the long run return of
these assets are impacted by nonsurviving agents and we provide an example
6
where the agent who drives the long run discount rate is different from the
agent who drives the long run risky returns and both of them are different
from the surviving agent who drives the instantaneous risk free rate in the
long run.
We also analyze the behavior of stock volatility, which converges to divi-
dend volatility. Asymptotically, only the surviving agent is present (in terms
of consumption shares or risk tolerance levels) and the stock volatility in the
heterogeneous economy converges to the surviving agent’s individual stock
volatility, which is the dividend volatility. We show that for finite times stock
volatility fluctuates between bounds determined by the maximal difference
between market prices of risk associated with different agents.
We get similar bounds for the optimal portfolios. If all risk aversions are
larger than one, then in the limit the optimal portfolios are driven by the
market price of risk associated with the surviving agent.
We now discuss additional related works. Dumas (1989) and Wang (1996)
are among the first papers to study equilibrium in the markets with two het-
erogeneous agents (heterogeneous in risk aversion levels). Bhamra and Uppal
(2009a) consider the same economy, and derive conditions under which excess
volatility is positive.5 Bhamra and Uppal (2009b) derive closed form expres-
sions as convergent power series for an economy populated by two CRRA
agents with arbitrary risk aversions, discount rates and heterogeneous be-
liefs. Dumas, Kurshev and Uppal (2009) also study excess volatility and
non-myopic optimal portfolios in a model with two CRRA agents with iden-
tical preferences but heterogeneous beliefs. An economy with heterogeneous
beliefs with two logarithmic agents who adapt their beliefs dynamically and
trade subject to portfolio constraints is studied in Detemple and Murthy
(1997). Jouini and Napp (2007, 2009) and Jouini et al. (2008) consider
heterogeneous beliefs, but homogenous risk aversion. Kogan et al. (2006)
also consider a two agent economy with agents maximizing utility only from
terminal consumption and get asymptotic results when horizon increases on
the impact of non surviving agents on asset prices. They pose as an open
question what the analogue of their result is when the agents maximize in-
termediate consumption. We provide answers to that question. From a quite
different perspective and in a more general setting, Kogan et al (2008) pro-
5The main message of Bhamra and Uppal (2009a) is that allowing the agents to trade in
an additional derivative security, making the market complete, may actually increase the
market volatility. Because of completeness, their equilibrium coincides with the Arrow-
Debreu equilibrium of Wang (1996).
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vide a typology of the different possible asymptotic behaviors in terms of
survival and price impact. Berrada (2008) studies the consumption shares
of several CRRA agents with same risk aversion and different beliefs, and
most results are obtained numerically. Cvitanic´ and Malamud (2009a,b,c)
consider equilibrium with many traders maximizing utility only from ter-
minal consumption. Berrada et al. (2007) provide necessary and sufficient
conditions for zero equilibrium trading volume in a general continuous-time
model with heterogeneous agents, multiple goods, and multiple securities.
Yan (2008) first introduced the same notion of the survival index that we
use, and obtains the result on the domination of the surviving agent in terms
of consumption shares. Sandroni (2000) and Blume and Easley (2006) study
survival with another definition of the survival index and in a model different
from ours.
2 The Model
We consider a continuous-time Arrow-Debreu economy with an infinite hori-
zon, in which heterogeneous agents maximize their expected utility from
future consumption.
Uncertainty is described by a one-dimensional, standard Brownian motion
Wt, t ∈ [0 , ∞) on a complete probability space (Ω,F , P ), where F is the
augmented filtration generated by Wt. There is a single consumption good
and we denote by D the aggregate dividend or endowment process. We make
the assumption that D satisfies the following stochastic differential equation
dDt = µDtdt+ σDtdWt D0 = 1
where the mean growth rate µ and the volatility σ are constants.
There are N (types of) agents indexed by i = 1, ..., N. Agents have dif-
ferent expectations about the future of the economy. More precisely, agents
disagree about the mean growth rate. We denote by µi the mean growth rate
anticipated by agent i. Letting
δi ≡ µi − µ
σ
denote agent i’s error in her perception of the growth of the economy nor-
malized by its risk6, we introduce the probability measure P i defined by
6The parameter δi also represents the difference between agent i’s perceived Sharpe
ratio and the true one.
8
its density with respect to P given by Zit = e
δiWt− 12 δ2i t. From agent i point
of view, the aggregate endowment process satisfies the following stochastic
differential equation
dDt = µiDtdt+ σDtdW
i
t D0 = 1
where, by Girsanov Theorem, W it ≡ Wt − δit is a Brownian motion with re-
spect to P i. Note that agents are persistent in their mistakes: the probability
measures P i may represent erroneous beliefs as well as behavioral biases like
optimism or pessimism.
Agent i’s utility function is given by ui (c) =
c1−γi−1
1−γi for γi > 0, where
γi is the relative risk aversion coefficient. In the following, we let bi ≡ 1γi
denote the relative risk tolerance of agent i. Agent i’s time preference rate is
denoted by ρi.
Agent i’s utility for a given consumption stream (ct) is then given by
EP
i
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρitui (ct) dt
]
where EP
i
denotes the expectation operator from agent i’s perspective. There
are then in our setting three possible sources of heterogeneity among agents:
heterogeneity in beliefs, heterogeneity in time preference rates and hetero-
geneity in risk aversion levels.
Agents have endowments denoted by
(
e∗
i
)
with
N∑
i=1
e∗
i
= D. We assume
that markets are complete which means that all Arrow-Debreu securities
can be traded. A state price density (or stochastic discount factor) M is a
positive process such that M(t, ω) corresponds to the price of the asset that
pays one dollar at date t and in state ω. For a given state price density M,
agent i’s intertemporal optimization program is given by
(OiM) : max
c
{
EP
i
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρitui (ct) dt
]
| E
[∫ ∞
0
Mt (ct − e∗it ) dt
]
≤ 0
}
.
We adopt the usual definition of equilibrium.
Definition 2.1 An equilibrium is a state price density M and consumption
processes (cit) such that each consumption process (cit) solves agent i’s opti-
mization program (OiM) and markets clear, i.e.
N∑
i=1
cit = Dt.
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We assume that such an equilibrium exists and in the next we let M
(resp. cit) denote the equilibrium state price density (resp. the equilibrium
consumption processes).
In order to deal with asset pricing issues, we suppose that agents can
continuously trade in a riskless asset and in risky stocks7. We let S0 denote
the riskless asset price process with dynamics dS0t = rtS
0
t dt, the parameter
r denoting the risk free rate. Since there is only one source of risk, all risky
assets have the same instantaneous Sharpe ratio and it suffices to focus on
one specific risky asset. We consider the asset S whose dividend process is
given by the total endowment of the economy and we denote respectively by
µS and σS its drift and volatility. We let
θ ≡ µS + Dt S
−1
t − r
σS
denote the asset’s Sharpe ratio or equivalently the market price of risk. The
parameters r, µS and σS are to be determined endogenously in equilibrium.
We let B (t, T ) denote the price at time t of the pure-discount bond price
delivering 1 dollar at time T, i.e.,
B (t, T ) ≡ 1
Mt
Et [MT ] .
We also introduce the average discount rate (“yield”) Y (t, T ) between time
t and time T defined by
Y (t, T ) ≡ − 1
T − t log B (t, T ) .
In order to deal with asymptotic issues, we recall the following terminol-
ogy. We say8 that two processes Xt and Yt are asymptotically equivalent if
limt→∞ XtYt = 1, which we denote by Xt ∼ Yt. We say that a process Xt
asymptotically dominates a process Yt if limt→∞ YtXt = 0.
The quantity cit
Dt
represents the consumption share of agent i at time t (in
equilibrium). We also introduce the quantity
ωit ≡ bicit∑N
j=1 bjcjt
7We refer to Duffie and Huang (1985) and to Riedel (2001) to show that our Arrow-
Debreu equilibrium can be implemented by continuous trading of such long-lived securities.
8As in e.g. Kogan et al. (2006).
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which represents the relative level of absolute risk tolerance9 of agent i at
time t, and plays an important part in describing the equilibrium (see, e.g.
Jouini and Napp, 2007).
3 Equilibrium in Homogeneous Economies
We start by considering the equilibrium characteristics that would prevail in
an economy made of agent i only or that would prevail in our economy if all
the initial endowment were concentrated on agent i.
We denote by Mi the equilibrium state price density in an economy with
only agent i. By the first order conditions in the homogeneous economies, we
have
Mit = e
−ρi tZitD
−γi
t = e
−
“
ρi+γi
“
µ−σ2
2
”
+ 1
2
δ2i
”
t + (δi−γiσ)Wt .
The market price of risk θi ≡ µS(t)+DtS
−1
t −rit
σS(t)
, the risk free rate ri and the
survival index κi (Yan, 2008) are respectively given
10 by
θi = (γiσ − δi), ri = ρi + γiµi − 1
2
γi (γi + 1)σ
2 and
κi ≡ ρi + γi(µ− σ
2
2
) +
1
2
δ2i .
The risk free rate represents the agent’s savings motives. The savings motives
increase with pessimism and with patience. We index by I0 the agent with
the highest savings motives, i.e., such that rI0 ≡ infi ri.
The market price of risk represents the agent’s motives to invest in the
risky asset. It increases with pessimism and with risk aversion. We index by
Iθmax (Iθmin) the agent with the highest (lowest) market price of risk.
The survival index satisfies κi = −1tE [logMit] and can then be inter-
preted as the growth rate of the state price density Mi. It decreases with pa-
tience, rationality, and risk aversion when µ ≥ σ2
2
. The survival index differs
from the risk free rate by an Itoˆ’s term, more precisely we have ri = κi− 12θ2i .
We index by IK the agent with the lowest survival index.
9The relative level of absolute risk tolerance of agent i at time t is given by
− u′iu′′i (cit)
[∑N
j=1− u
′
i
u′′i
(cit)
]−1
.
10Letting µMi and σMi respectively denote the drift and volatility of the state price
density Mi, the market price of risk and the risk free rate satisfy rit = −µMi(t) and
θit = −σMi(t).
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We make the assumption that each of the criteria is minimal (or maximal)
for one agent only, i.e., that I0, IK , Iθmin and Iθmax are well defined and
unique. If there is only heterogeneity in time preference rates, the agent with
the lowest survival index is also the agent with the highest savings motives
(agent IK coincides with agent I0) and is the most patient agent. If there is
only heterogeneity in beliefs, agent IK is the most rational agent and differs
from the agent with the highest savings motives who is the most pessimistic
agent. If there is only heterogeneity in risk aversion and if µ > σ
2
2
, agent IK
is the least risk averse agent.
The next proposition sums up the main results about the equilibrium
characteristics in the homogeneous economies.
Proposition 3.1 In the homogeneous economies made of agent i only, the
following properties hold.
• The risk free rate ri and the market price of risk θi are constant and
given by θi = (γiσ− δi) and ri = ρi + γiµi− 12γi (γi + 1)σ2. The stock’s
drift and volatility are also constant and given by σiS = σ and µiS =
ri + σθi.
• The state price density Mi can be written in the form Mit = e−κit −θiWt
where κi ≡ ρi + γi(µ− σ22 ) + 12δ2i denotes agent i’s survival index. The
state price density Mit is lognormal with average e
−rit and median e−κit.
• When θi is nonnegative (resp. nonpositive), then the state price density
Mi (t,Wt) is decreasing (resp. increasing) in Wt, ranging from infinity
to 0, with Mi (t, 0) = e
−κit.
• The state price density of the agent with the lowest (resp. highest)
market price of risk dominates the other state price densities for positive
(resp. negative) large values of W , i.e. limWt→+∞
Mi(t,Wt)
MIθmin
(t,Wt)
= 0 for
all i 6= Iθmin and limWt→−∞ Mi(t,Wt)MIθmax (t,Wt) = 0 for all i 6= Iθmax.
• The state price density of the agent with the lowest survival index
asymptotically dominates the other state price densities, i.e.,
limt→∞ MitMIKt
= 0 for all i 6= IK
• The savings motives drive the risk free rate and the bond price. We
have, for all (t, T ) , Bi (t, T ) = e
−ri(T−t) and Yi (t, T ) = ri. The bond
12
price of the agent with the highest savings motives asymptotically dom-
inates the other bond prices, i.e., limT→+∞
Bi(t,T )
BI0 (t,T )
= 0 for all i 6= I0.
In particular, different agents dominate different prices; agent I0 domi-
nates the asymptotic bond prices, agent IK asymptotically dominates Arrow-
Debreu prices, agent Iθmin dominates the prices of the Arrow-Debreu assets
associated to very good states of the world and agent Iθmax dominates the
prices of the Arrow-Debreu assets associated to very bad states of the world.
4 Equilibrium state price density
In the setting with heterogeneous agents, the first-order conditions of the
agents optimization programs (OiM) give us the existence of Lagrange mul-
tipliers λi such that, for all i, the equilibrium state price density is given
by
Mt = λie
−ρitZitc
−γi
it . (1)
Since prices are in terms of date 0 consumption goods, we have M0 = 1 and
λi = c
γi
i0. The market clearing condition then leads to
∑N
i=1 ci0e
−ρibitZbiitM
−bi
t =
Dt, which can be written in the form
N∑
i=1
ci0
(
Mi
M
)bi
= 1. (2)
When the agents have the same level of risk tolerance b (and possibly differ
in their beliefs or in their time preference rates), we get that the equilibrium
state price density is a weighted power average of the state price densities
in homogeneous economies (the power being given by the common level of
risk tolerance). Indeed, we then easily deduce from equation (2) that M =(∑N
i=1 ci0M
b
it
)1/b
. In our setting, the following lemma provides an expression
of the state price density M as well as bounds on M in terms of the state
price densities in the homogeneous economies. It is a direct analog of Lemma
2.1 from Cvitanic´ and Malamud (2008).
Lemma 4.1 1. Letting F (a1, ..., an) be the function defined as the unique
solution to
∑N
i=1 F
−biabii = 1, we have M = F (c
γ1
10M1, ..., c
γN
N0MN) .
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2. Let Γ ≥ 1 be such that Γ bi > 1 for all i and γ ≤ 1 be such that γ bi ≤ 1
for all i . Then,(
N∑
i=1
c
γi/γ
i0 M
1/γ
i
)γ
≤M ≤
(
N∑
i=1
c
γi/Γ
i0 M
1/Γ
i
)Γ
. (3)
Notice that, up to a normalization, this means that the state price density
M is bounded below by a γ−average of the Mi’s and is bounded above by a
Γ− average of the Mi’s.
The state price density M fluctuates in time and state of the world. We
easily get from equation (2) that
min
1≤i≤N
Mi ≤ M ≤ max
1≤i≤N
Mi.
For each state of the world, the state price density M lies in the range
bounded by the lowest and the highest state price densities and M can then
be interpreted as a kind of average of the state price densities Mi. The fact
that the state price density M is bounded by two “averages” of the individ-
ual state price densities (Lemma 4.1) and the properties of the state price
densities obtained in Proposition 3.1 enable us to show how the state price
density M fluctuates with Wt (or equivalently with aggregate endowment)
as well as its asymptotic behavior.
Corollary 4.1 • The asymptotic behavior of the state price density is
given by Mt ∼ cγIKIK0MIKt.
• If all the state price densities Mit = Mi(t,Wt) are decreasing in Wt,
then
– the state price density Mt = M(t,Wt) is also decreasing in Wt,
– the state price density Mt = M(t,Wt) satisfies
lim
Wt→−∞
M (t,Wt)
c
γIθmax
θmax0
MIθmaxt
= lim
Wt→+∞
M (t,Wt)
c
γIθmin
θmin0
MIθmint
= 1.
Asymptotically and in extreme states of the world, the state price density
M is equivalent to the state price density that would prevail in an economy
made of homogeneous agents with a different endowment distribution. This
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class of homogeneous agents is given by the agent who dominates the indi-
vidual state price density Mi in the considered states of the world: agent IK
asymptotically, agent Iθmax in the very bad states and agent Iθmin in the very
good states.
The asymptotic result implies, in particular, that except agent IK , all the
agents have no price impact in the sense of Kogan et al. (2008, Definition 2)
since we have for all s > 0,
lim
t→∞
Mt+s/Mt
MIKt+s/MIKt
= 1.
Later below, we shall analyze if the other agents really have no price impact
in the sense that the prices of all assets are asymptotically the same as in
the economy with the agent with the lowest survival index only.
In Section 6 we shall analyze the expression of the drift and volatility of
the state price density M (in other words the risk free rate and the market
price of risk) and how they relate to the drift and volatility of MIK ,MIθmax
and MIθmin in extreme states of the world and asymptotically.
5 Consumption shares and relative levels of
risk tolerance
In this section we analyze the expression and the behavior of the consumption
shares and of the relative levels of risk tolerance. This analysis is interesting
for survival issues, or more generally to know which agent dominates the
market in terms of endowment shares. It will also prove to be useful to
analyze the behavior of equilibrium characteristics, because, as we shall see
in the next section, they rely on the relative levels of risk tolerance.
For each agent i, her consumption share at time t is given by cit
Dt
. We get
from equation (1) that cit
Dt
= e−ρi bi tM−bit Z
bi
it ci0, hence, using the expression
of the state price densities Mi, we have
cit
Dt
= ci0
(
Mit
Mt
)bi
.
The consumption share can equivalently be written in the form
cit
Dt
= ci0M
bi
i F
−bi (cγ110M1, ..., c
γN
N0MN) .
15
The relative level of risk tolerance is given by ωit ≡ bicitPN
j=1 bjcjt
. Differentiat-
ing the equation
∑N
i=1 F
−biabii = 1, we get Fai (c
γ1
10M1, ..., c
γN
N0MN) =
Mt
c
γi
i0Mi
ωit
hence the relative level of risk tolerance can be written in the form
ωit = c
γi
i0MiF
−1Fai .
As in Kogan et al. (2006) or Yan (2008), we say that investor i becomes
extinct if limt→+∞ citDt = 0, that she survives if extinction does not occur and
that she dominates the market asymptotically if limt→+∞ citDt = 1. We easily
deduce from the properties of the state price densities obtained in Proposition
3.1 the following properties of the consumption shares and relative levels of
risk tolerance, the first of which was obtained by Yan (2008).
Corollary 5.1 • Only the agent with the lowest survival index survives
and dominates the market asymptotically, i.e., limt→∞ citDt = 0 for all
i 6= IK, and limt→∞ cIK tDt = 1.
• Only the agent with the lowest survival index impacts asymptotically
the relative level of risk tolerance, i.e., limt→∞ ωit = 0 for all i 6= IK,
and limt→∞ ωIKt = 1.
• We have limWt→∞ ωi (t,Wt) = limWt→∞ ciD (t,Wt) = 0 for all i 6=
Iθmin and limWt→∞ ωIθmin (t,Wt) = limWt→∞
cIθmin
D
(t,Wt) = 1. We have
limWt→−∞ ωi (t,Wt) = limWt→−∞
ci
D
(t,Wt) = 0 for all i 6= Iθmax and
limWt→−∞ ωIθmax (t,Wt) = limWt→−∞
cIθmax
D
(t,Wt) = 1.
• We have ∂ωi(t,Wt)
∂Wt
= ωit
[
bi(θt − θi)−
∑
j ωjtbj(θt − θj)
]
and there is a
shift following good news in the relative levels of risk tolerance towards
agents with a relatively high bi(θt − θi).
This implies that only the agent with the lowest survival index (resp. with
the highest/lowest market price of risk) dominates the market in the sense of
the consumption shares or in the sense of the risk tolerance asymptotically
(resp. in very bad/good states of the world). As previously seen, this agent is
the agent who values the wealth more than the other agents in the considered
state.
Note that the agent with the highest bi(θt − θi) is the most optimistic
agent when there is only heterogeneity in beliefs, and is the least risk averse
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agent when there is only heterogeneity in risk aversion levels. In both cases
this agent is the one who has the highest risk exposure and is then the most
favoured by good news.
6 Risk free rate and market price of risk
If we denote by µM and σM the drift and the volatility of the state price
density processM, it is easy to obtain as in the standard setting that the short
term rate rt and the market price of risk θt ≡ µS(t)+DtS
−1
t −rt
σS(t)
are respectively
given by rt = −µM(t) and θt = −σM(t).
The next proposition gives us the expression of the risk free rate and of
the market price of risk in our heterogeneous setting. Detemple and Murthy
(1997, Proposition 5) gives the expression of the risk free rate and of the
market price of risk in a model with portfolio constraints, heterogeneous
beliefs, homogeneous risk aversion levels and homogeneous time preference
rates.
Proposition 6.1 The risk free rate is given by
rt =
N∑
i=1
ωitri −
(
N∑
i=1
θiωit
)(
N∑
j=1
θj (1− bj)ωjt
)
+
1
2
(
N∑
k=1
(1− bk)ωkt
)(
N∑
i=1
θiωit
)2
+
1
2
N∑
i=1
(1− bi) θ2iωit
and the market price of risk is given by
θt =
N∑
i=1
ωitθi,
where we recall that ωjt ≡ bjcjtP
k bkckt
, and where θi ≡ γiσ − δi and ri ≡ ρi +
γiµi− 12γi (γi + 1)σ2 respectively denote the market price of risk and the risk
free rate in the economy populated by agent i only.
The risk free rate and the market price of risk fluctuate in time and state
of the world and these fluctutations are directly related to the fluctuations
of the relative levels of risk tolerance ωit. In particular, when one agent
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dominates the others in terms of risk tolerance then her individual market
price of risk (risk free rate) dominates the equilibrium market price of risk
(risk free rate). The market price of risk is a weighted average of the market
prices of risk in the homogeneous economies. It fluctuates between the two
bounds which are the lowest and the highest market price of risk in the
different homogeneous economies. The risk free rate differs from an average
of the homogeneous risk free rates and in particular can be lower than the
lowest risk free rate or higher than the highest risk free rate11. More precisely,
we get the following result.
Corollary 6.1 • The market price of risk satisfies
min
i
θi ≤ θt ≤ max
i
θi.
In addition, we have
lim
Wt→+∞
θ (t,Wt) = min
i
θi = θIθmin , limWt→−∞
θ (t,Wt) = max
i
θi = θIθmax
and the asymptotic market price of risk is given by limt→∞ θt = θIK .
• The risk free rate satisfies
rt ≤
N∑
i=1
ωitri ≤ max
i
ri if γi ≤ 1 for all i,
rt ≥
N∑
i=1
ωitri ≥ min
i
ri ≡ rI0 if γi ≥ 1 for all i.
In addition, we have
lim
Wt→+∞
r (t,Wt) = rIθmin , limWt→−∞
r (t,Wt) = rIθmax
and the asymptotic risk free rate is given by limt→∞ rt = rIK .
11For instance, consider the case where only δi is heterogeneous. It is easy to see that
rt is then given by
rt = Eωt [ri] +
1
2
(1− b)V arωt [δi]
where Eωt and V arωt are respectively the expectation and the variance operators associ-
ated with the weights ωit. In particular, in the case N = 2, e∗
1
= e∗
2
and δ1 = −δ2, r0 lies
in [r1, r2] if and only if |1− b| δ ≤ 2γσ.
18
The result on the asymptotic risk free rate can be seen as the generaliza-
tion of Yan (2008, Corollary 1) to the case with heterogeneous risk aversions
and time preference rates. The asymptotic behavior of the risk free rate and
of the market price of risk is driven by the agent with the lowest survival
index only. She is the only surviving agent (in the sense of the consumption
share or of the relative level of risk tolerance), hence is the only one to impact
asymptotically the instantaneous risk free rate and market price of risk.
Analogously, only the agent with the lowest (resp. highest) market price
of risk impacts the behavior of the risk free rate and of the market price of
risk in the heterogeneous economy for very high (resp. very low) values of Wt.
She is the only agent present in the economy (in the sense of the consumption
shares or of the relative levels of risk tolerance) in those states. This is to
be related to the results of Corollaries 4.1 and 5.1. In particular, the market
price of risk in the heterogeneous economy reaches the two bounds in very
good and very bad states of the world. It is minimal in very good states of
the world, and maximal in very bad states of the world. The next corollary
shows how the market price of risk fluctuates with aggregate endowment.
Corollary 6.2 The market price of risk θt = θ (t,Wt) is monotone decreas-
ing in Wt for any parameters of the model. The market price of risk is always
countercyclical.
Note that this countercyclicality property is consistent with the observed
variations of the equity premium. Indeed, there is evidence that the equity
premium is time varying and as noted by, e.g., Campbell and Cochrane (1999)
“equity risk premia seem to be higher at business cycles troughs than they
are at peaks”. This result generalizes the result obtained by Jouini and Napp
(2009) in the specific setting of agents who only differ in their beliefs and who
are on average rational. It is quite striking to obtain the countercyclicality
result for any distribution of the characteristics (risk aversion level, beliefs,
time preference rates). It is heterogeneity and its impact on the fluctuations
of the relative levels of risk tolerance ωit which generates this countercyclical
behavior.
We also get monotonicity results for the risk free rate in the case of
homogeneous risk aversion.
Corollary 6.3 If risk aversion is homogeneous, that is bi = b for all i, then
• if the sequences −σ(δi) +0.5(b−1)(δ2i )−ρi and (δi) are anti-comonotone,
then rt is procyclical
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• if the sequences −σ(δi) + 0.5(b− 1)(δ2i )− ρi and (δi) are comonotone,
then rt is countercyclical.
For instance, if time preference parameters are also homogeneous, and if
agents hove logarithmic utility functions, we immediately get that the risk
free rate is procyclical. For general utility functions, we still obtain the pro-
cyclicality result as long as agents are not biased in their beliefs. These
results remain valid if time preference rates ρi are no longer homogeneous
but comonotone with the beliefs δi. These results are consistent with ob-
served behavior since empirical studies have confirmed that the short term
rate is a procyclical indicator of economic activity (see e.g. Friedman, 1986,
Blanchard and Watson, 1986).
7 Bond Prices
As seen in Section 3, in the homogeneous economies, the average discount
rate between time t and T is the same for all (t, T ) and given by the constant
risk free rate. Indeed, we have in the homogeneous economy made of agent i
only, Bi (t, T ) = e
−(T−t)ri , and Yi (t, T ) = ri. The yield curves, representing,
for all time t, the discount rates Yi (t, T ) as a function of T − t, are the same
for all time t and flat.
In the heterogeneous economy, the yield curves are not flat. The instan-
taneous discount rate defined by limT→t Y (t, T ) is given by the risk free rate
rt. The next proposition characterizes the asymptotic discount rate.
Proposition 7.1 The asymptotic average discount rate is determined by the
agent with the highest savings motives, i.e., for all t,
lim
T→+∞
Y (t, T ) = rI0 .
The same reasoning as above holds: when one agent dominates the indi-
vidual price of an asset then she makes the price of that asset in the heteroge-
neous economy. As seen in Proposition 3.1, the agent with the highest savings
motives dominates the price of the very long term bond because it is most
attractive for her. The agent with the highest savings motives then drives
the asymptotic average discount rate. This proposition is the extension to
the setting with three possible sources of heterogeneity of the proposition of
Gollier and Zeckhauser (1996) for the case of heterogeneous time preference
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rates, of Wang (1996) for heterogeneous levels of risk aversion and of Jouini
et al. (2008) for heterogeneous beliefs.
In the setting with heterogeneous time preference rates only, the same
agent drives the asymptotic discount rate and the asymptotic risk free rate.
Indeed, in that case, the agent with the lowest survival index is also the agent
with the highest savings motives, namely the most patient agent. Apart from
this setting, it is quite striking that the agent that drives the asymptotic av-
erage discount rate differs from the agent that drives the asymptotic risk free
rate, even though the discount rate is an average of the risk free rates. Indeed,
we have Y (t, T ) = − 1
T−t logE
Q
t
[
exp− ∫ T
t
rsds
]
where Q is the risk-neutral
probability measure, with rs → rIK and Y (t, T )→T→∞ rI0 . Analogously, we
have Y (t, T ) = − 1
T−t logEt
[
MT
Mt
]
with MT
Mt
∼ MIKT
MIKt
and Y (t, T ) ∼ YI0 (t, T ) .
In the case with heterogeneous beliefs only, the risk free rate converges
to the rate of the most rational agent whereas the asymptotic discount rate
is driven by the most pessimistic agent.
In particular, Proposition 7.1 as well as Corollary 6.1 imply that when t is
large enough, the yield curve representing Y (t, T ) as a function of (T − t) is
driven by the risk free rate of the agent with the lowest survival index (agent
IK) at one end of the yield curve, i.e., for small values of (T − t), whereas at
the other end, i.e., for (T − t) large enough, it is driven by the risk free rate
of the agent with the highest savings motives or equivalently the lowest risk
free rate (agent I0). The aim of the remainder of this section is to show that
the yield curve is defined stepwise, and that each subinterval is associated
with a given agent in the sense that the marginal rate on that subinterval
corresponds to the rate in the economy made of that agent only. Moreover,
that agent is the agent who values the most a given zero coupon bond as-
sociated to the subinterval and is characterized by a maximization program
involving a weighted average of the savings motives and of the survival index.
In the homogeneous economy made of agent i only, the price, seen from
date 0, of a zero coupon bond between time t and time T and in state ω is
given by Et [MiT ] = e
−ri(T−t)e−κit −θiWt . This implies that for λ ∈ [0, 1] , we
have EλT [MiT ] = e
−li(λ)T e−θiWλT where
li (λ) = [λκi + (1− λ) ri] =
[
κi − (1− λ) 1
2
θ2i
]
is a weighted average of the survival index and of the risk free rate. Since
(li (λ) , λ ∈ [0, 1]) is a family of line segments, there exist pairs of values
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((Ij, λj) , j = 1, · · · , K) such that
min
i
li (λ) = lIj(λ) for all λ ∈ (λj, λj+1)
where λ0 = 0 and λK+1 = 1. For λ near 0, agent I0 satisfies rI0 = infi ri and
for λ near 1, agent IK satisfies κIK = infi κi.
The index li (λ) drives the asymptotic behavior of the price EλT [MiT ]
in the sense that limT→∞
EλT [MiT ]
EλT [MIjT ]
= 0 for all i 6= Ij when λ ∈ (λj, λj+1).
This is due to the fact that the price Et [MiT ] involves both the state price
density Mit whose asymptotic behavior is driven by the survival index and
the bond price Bi (t, T ) , whose asymptotic behavior is driven by the savings
motives. For λ = 0, we retrieve the fact that agent I0 (with the lowest risk
free rate) dominates the prices of the zero coupon bond Bi (0, T ) when T is
large enough. For λ = 1, we retrieve the fact that agent IK (with the lowest
survival index) dominates the state price densities MiT for T large enough.
For λ ∈ (0, 1) , we obtain that agent Ij (with the lowest index li (λ) , mixing
the survival index and the savings motives) dominates the prices EλT [MiT ]
when T is large enough.
Consider the case with heterogeneity in beliefs only. Then agent I0 is the
most pessimistic agent and agent IK is the most rational agent. Agent I1 is
the most pessimistic agent once agent I0 is excluded, agent I2 is the most
pessimistic agent once agents I0 and I1 are excluded, etc. Moreover, the inter-
vals (λj, λj+1) on which lIj(λ) = mini li (λ) are given by λj =
2γσ
2γσ−(δIj−1+δIj)
.
Note that apart from agent IK (who might be optimistic or pessimistic) all
the agents Ij (for j = 0, ..., K − 1) are pessimistic. This is due to the fol-
lowing: In the case with heterogeneity on the beliefs only, minimizing li(λ)
amounts to minimizing the average of the survival index and of the risk free
rate associated to the i− th agent. The survival index reaches its minimum
for the lowest δi in absolute value (i.e., for the most rational agent), while
the risk free rate increases with δi. Starting from the most rational agent, it
is clear that the only way to possibly decrease li(λ) consists in moving in the
direction of more pessimism.
In our heterogeneous economy, we obtain as a corollary to Equation (3)
that (
N∑
i=1
c
γi/γ
i0 Et [MiT ]
1/γ
)γ
≤ Et [MT ] ≤
(
N∑
i=1
c
γi/Γ
i0 Et [MiT ]
1/Γ
)Γ
(4)
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which leads to the following results on the bond prices.
Proposition 7.2 • The bond prices satisfy
Et [Mαt] ∼ cγIjIj0Et
[
MIjαt
]
and B (t, αt) ∼ c
γIj
Ij0
cγKIK0
Et
[
MIjαt
]
MIKαt
for all α ∈ ( 1
λj+1
, 1
λj
).
• We have, for α ∈ ( 1
λj
, 1
λj−1
),
Y (α) ≡ lim
t→∞
Y (t, αt) =
1
α− 1
[
κIK − α lIj (1/α)
]
and the convergence is uniform on compact subsets of (1,∞) . We have
limα→1 Y (α) = rIK and limα→∞ Y (α) = rI0 .
• The marginal rates associated to the asymptotic yield curve (the instan-
taneous forward rates) are given by
d
dα
[Y (α)(α− 1)] = rIj
on ( 1
λj+1
, 1
λj
).
The above result provides then the shape of the asymptotic yield curve.
However, it is important to notice that, asymptotically, yield curves at differ-
ent dates are obtained through homothetic transformations and not through
translations. In other words, for t large enough, all yield curves will have the
same shape, but at different scales.
Different segments of the (asymptotic) yield curve are determined by dif-
ferent agents with different characteristics. More precisely, the marginal dis-
count rate for the interval ( 1
λj+1
, 1
λj
) is determined by agent Ij.These results
are particularly in line with the Preferred Habitat Theory (PHT) developed
by Modigliani and Sutch (1966). Following this theory, if an investor’s in-
vestment horizon coincides with the maturity of a zero-coupon bond then
she will consider the long-term bond as riskless and require a premium for
holding short-term bonds. Each investor has then a preferred habitat that
corresponds to her ”natural” investment horizon. This investment horizon
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might result from institutional factors, regulatory constraints or from differ-
ent levels of risk exposure of the background portfolio at different maturities.
In our framework, this investment horizon naturally emerges for each agent,
as the result of agents’ heterogeneity.
It is interesting to note that even though only one agent survives in the
long term, non surviving agents might continue to have an impact on the yield
curve. One may argue that the impact of agent Ij is only between (
1
λj+1
t, 1
λj
t)
and is then at more and more distant horizons when t increases. However, we
can construct examples where non surviving agents impact prices and where
this impact does not vanish asymptotically, as illustrated in the following
example.
Example 7.1 Assuming heterogeneity in beliefs only, we know that rIK cor-
responds to the risk free rate in the economy populated by the most rational
agent and rI0 corresponds to the risk free rate in the economy populated by
the most pessimistic agent only. Let us consider an asset (growing perpetu-
ity) with a deterministic dividend flow dt = d0 exp(rˆt) with rI0 < rˆ < rIK .
The price at date t of this asset in the economy populated by agent IK only
is given by
pt = d0 exp (rIK t)
∫ ∞
t
exp ((rˆ − rIK )s) ds =
d0
rIK − rˆ
exp (rˆt)
in terms of date t prices. On the other hand, the price p′t of this asset in
the heterogeneous economy is infinite in date t prices terms. Indeed, if we
denote by r¯s the marginal discount rate (from date t point of view) at date
s (i.e. r¯s = − 1B(t,s) ∂B(t,s)∂s ) we know that r¯s is arbitrarily close to rI0 for s
sufficiently large. More precisely, let s such that r¯v ≤ rˆ− ε for ε > 0 and for
all v ≥ s. We have
p′t = d0 exp (rˆt)
∫ ∞
t
exp
(∫ u
t
(rˆ − r¯v)dv
)
du
≥ d0 exp (rˆt) exp
(∫ s
t
(rˆ − r¯v)dv
)∫ ∞
s
exp
(∫ u
s
(rˆ − r¯v)dv
)
du
and it is easy to see that the last integral is infinite and so is p′t.
In order to explore further the shape of the yield curve and the relative
impact of the different agents, we consider the case of an economy populated
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by continuously many agents. Let us first assume that the characteristics
(ρ, γ, δ) of these agents are continuously distributed on some subset U of
R+ ×R+ ×R. In such a setting, each λ is the preferred habitat of the agent
whose characteristics (ρ(λ), γ(λ), δ(λ)) satisfy
(ρ(λ), γ(λ), δ(λ)) = arg max
(ρ,γ,δ)∈U
{−(ρ+γ(µ− 1
2
σ2)+
1
2
δ2)+
1
2
(1−λ) (δ−γσ)2}.
Agent IK corresponds to λ = 1 and we get for the yield between t and T ≥ t
that
Y (t, T ) (5)
∼ (T − t)−1
(
Tρ
(
t
T
)
− tρ(1)−
(
tγ(1)− Tγ
(
t
T
))(
µ− σ
2
2
)
(6)
− 1
2
(
tδ2(1)− Tδ2
(
t
T
))
− T − t
2
(
δ
(
t
T
)
− γ
(
t
T
)
σ
)2)
where the equivalence is meant asymptotically in t, the ratio t/T being fixed.
Example 7.2 Assume that there are continuously many beliefs δ, while the
discount rate ρ and the risk aversion γ are constant across the agents. More
precisely, let us take U = {ρ} × {γ} × [δmin, δmax] . Then we get
(ρ(λ), γ(λ), δ(λ)) = (ρ, γ, γσ(1− 1/λ))
as long as γσ(1 − 1/λ) is in [δmin, δmax] . For 1/λ large enough, we have
δ(λ) = δmin. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that 0 ∈ [δmin, δmax] which
gives us that δ(1) = 0. Substituting in equation (5), we get
Y (t, T ) (7)
∼ ρ+ γ(µ− 1
2
σ2)− 1
2
γ2σ2
T
t
, for
T
t
∈
[
1, 1− δmin
γσ
]
∼ ρ+ γ(µ− 1
2
σ2)− 1
2
(δmin − γσ)2 + 1
2
T
T − tδ
2
min , for
T
t
∈
[
1− δmin
γσ
,∞
)
The asymptotic term structure is inverted. It is linear until a certain thresh-
old after which it converges asymptotically to the rate of the most pessimistic
agent. As in the discrete setting, the different habitats are ordered on the
time line by the level of pessimism of the associated agents.
25
Example 7.3 In the case where only ρ varies, i.e., U = [ρmin, ρmax]×{γ}×
{δ} , we have
(ρ(λ), γ(λ), δ(λ)) = (ρmin, γ, δ)
and the asymptotic term structure is constant. The whole asymptotic yield
curve is associated to the lowest level of impatience.
Example 7.4 Consider now the case where only γ varies. More precisely,
suppose U = {ρ} × [γmin, γmax] × {δ} . It is shown in the Appendix that for
the case where the economy is shrinking, µ < σ2/2, the whole yield curve
(which is flat in this case) is associated to a single agent (the most risk-
averse agent with γ = γmax, or the least risk-averse agent with γ = γmin,
depending on how large is γmax). When the economy is growing, if the highest
risk aversion is large enough, the yield curve is determined for short horizons
by the agent with the lowest level of risk aversion (i.e., γ = γmin) and for
long horizons by the agent with the highest level of risk aversion (i.e., γ =
γmax). We have then two different habitats and the more distant one in
time is associated to a higher level of risk aversion than the less distant
one. As noted by Wang (1996), long term bonds are more attractive to more
risk averse agents as hedging instruments against future downturns of the
economy. Indeed, the more risk averse investors are more averse to low
levels of future consumption. Consequently they exert a stronger influence
on their equilibrium price. However, γmax should be large enough with respect
to γmin, for this phenomenon to occur. If not, we may have an inversion :
γmax determines the short term rates and γmin the long term ones.
8 Stock price and cumulative returns
We have determined the expression of the market price of risk θt ≡ µS(t)+DtS
−1
t −rt
σS(t)
and of the risk free rate rt and analyzed their asymptotic properties in Section
6. We now analyze the expression of the drift µS(t) and volatility σS(t) of
the stock price and their asymptotic properties. We also analyze the asymp-
totic properties of the price dividend ratio and of the cumulative returns.
In particular, are they given by the quantities of the economy made of the
surviving agent only ?
We recall that in the homogeneous economies the volatility is a constant
given by σ . In the homogeneous economy, populated only by agent i, it is
easy to obtain that the stock price is finite if and only if, as in Yan (2008),
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ρi + (γi − 1)µi − 12γi(γi − 1)σ2 > 0. The stock price-dividend ratio at time t
is then constant and given by(
S
D
)
i
≡ Et
[∫ ∞
t
Miτ Dτ
MitDt
dτ
]
=
[
ρi + (γi − 1)µi − 1
2
γi(γi − 1)σ2
]−1
.
The cumulative expected return on rolling all the money in stock between
time t and time T is then given by
Ri (t, T ) ≡ Et
[
SiT
Sit
e
R T
t
Dτ
Siτ
dτ
]
= e
h
µ+[( SD )i]
−1i
(T−t)
and the associated yield curve,
T → 1
T − t logRi (t, T ) = µ+ ρi + (γi − 1)µi −
1
2
γi(γi − 1)σ2
is flat and the same for all t.
8.1 Volatility and price dividend ratio
In our heterogeneous economy, we obtain the following results on the volatil-
ity and the price dividend ratio.
Recall that θi = γiσ − δi .
Proposition 8.1 1. The volatility parameter of the stock price is given
by
σS (t) = σ +
Et
[∫∞
t
(θt − θτ )MτDτdτ
]
Et
[∫∞
t
MτDτ dτ
] .
In particular,
σ + min
i
θi −max
i
θi ≤ σSt ≤ σ + max
i
θi −min
i
θi,
2. The asymptotic stock price volatility satisfies
lim
t→∞
σS (t) = σ.
3. The asymptotic price dividend ratio satisfies
lim
t→∞
St
Dt
=
(
S
D
)
IK
.
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4. Suppose risk aversion is homogeneous. Then,
• If 0.5b(1 − b)δ2i + bρi − bσδi is anti-co-monotone with δi then StDt is
procyclical (increases with Wt) and the excess volatility is positive, i.e.
σS (t) ≥ σ.
• If 0.5b(1 − b)δ2i + bρi − bσδi is co-monotone with δi then StDt is coun-
tercyclical (decreases with Wt) and the excess volatility is negative, i.e.
σS (t) ≤ σ.
The volatility is not a constant as in the standard setting, due to the
stochastic market price of risk. It can fluctuate in time and state of the
world. The previous proposition gives us the range in which it fluctuates.
As far as asymptotic properties are concerned, we obtain a positive answer
to the question raised above. We obtain that only the surviving agent (i.e.,
the agent with the lowest survival index) has an impact on the asymptotic
volatility and price dividend ratio.
However, as in the case of bonds, we now show that even though non
surviving agents do not have an impact on the long run volatility and price
dividend ratio, they may have an impact on the long run returns.
8.2 Cumulative returns
The cumulative expected return on rolling all the money in the stock between
time t and T is given by
R(t, T ) = Et
[
ST
St
e
R T
t DsS
−1
s ds
]
(8)
= E
(1)
t
[
ST
DT
e
R T
t DsS
−1
s ds
]
Et [DT ]
Dt
St
(9)
where P
(1)
T is the probability measure on FT whose density with respect to
the restriction PT of P on FT is proportional to DT . We also denote by P (1)
the extension12 of the probability measures P
(1)
T to the set of infinite paths.
Equation (9) shows that the asymptotic behavior of St
Dt
is as a key element
in the determination of the asymptotic cumulative equity return. As seen in
12The existence of such a probability measure is guaranted by the Kolmogorov extension
Theorem.
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Proposition 8.1, this ratio is asymptotically given by
(
S
D
)
IK
and is determin-
istic. However, even though this convergence is an almost sure convergence
under P, it is not clear whether or not the limit remains the same13 under
P (1). In fact, the optimal consumption of agent i can be rewritten as follows
cit = e
−ρ(1)i bitM−bit (Z
(1)
it )
bi ci0
where
ρ
(1)
i = ρi − δiσ2 and Z(1)it = eδiW
(1)
t − 12 δ2i t
and where W
(1)
t is a standard Brownian motion under P
(1). Thus, under
this new measure everything looks the same, apart from the fact that agents
have discount rates given by ρ
(1)
i = ρi − δiσ2 and that the drift is given by
µ(1) = µ + σ2. This means that, under P (1), the surviving agent is no more
agent IK but agent A(1) characterized by
(ρ
(1)
A(1) + γA(1)(µ
(1) − 1
2
σ2) +
1
2
δ2A(1)) = min
i
(ρ
(1)
i + γi(µ
(1) − 1
2
σ2) +
1
2
δ2i ).
This suggest that survival and long run impact are different concepts. In
the next we will illustrate the fact that the long run impact is determined by
different agents depending on the asset under consideration.
Intuitively, one would expect from equation (9) that the cumulative equity
returns converge to those determined by agent A(1). In fact, the long run
return in the homogeneous economy populated by agent A(1) only provides
a lower bound for the long run return in our economy. Since a change of
probability leads to a change of surviving agent, it is possible to obtain other
lower bounds by the introduction of well chosen artificial probabilities. The
next proposition provides such a lower bound based on the consideration of
a parametrized family of such artificial probabilities.
Proposition 8.2 Let t = λT. We have
lim inf
T→∞
(T − t)−1 logR(t, T ) ≥ µ+ max
α
(
−1
2
σ2(1− α)2 +
(
S
D
)−1
A(α)
)
13Indeed, the restrictions of the measures P and P (1) on each sigma-algebra Ft are
equivalent, but they are not equivalent on F∞. This is why it is possible to get a different
almost sure limit.
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where A(α) is characterized by
ρA(α) − δA(α)σ2α + γA(α)(µ− 1
2
σ2 + σ2α) +
1
2
δ2A(α)
= min
i
(
ρi − δiσ2α + γi
(
µ− 1
2
σ2 + σ2α
)
+
1
2
δ2i
)
(10)
and were r(A(α)) corresponds to the instantaneous riskless rate that would
prevail in the economy populated by agent A(α).
Example 8.1 Assume that all agents have the same level of risk aversion
γ and the same time preference parameter ρ, but have heterogeneous beliefs
that vary continuously taking values in [δmin, δmax] with δmin < 0 and δmax >
[(γ − 1)σ + 1]σ2 > 0. We have
ρ− δA(α)σ2α + 0.5δ2A(α) = min
i
(ρ− δiσ2α + 1
2
δ2i )
which leads to
δA(α) = σ
2α
as long as σ2α ∈ [δmin, δmax] . We have then
lim inf
T→∞
(T − t)−1 log R(t, T )
≥ γµ+ρ−0.5(γ−1)σ2−(γ−1)2σ2+σ2 max
α∈
h
δmin
σ2
, δmax
σ2
i (−0.5(1− α)2 + (γ − 1)σα)
The maximum is reached for
α∗ = (γ − 1)σ + 1
which gives
δA∗ = σ
2((γ − 1)σ + 1) > 0
By construction, the long run return in this economy is higher than the long
run return in the economy populated by agent A∗ only. Note also that
µ+
(
S
D
)−1
i
= µ+ ρ+ (γ − 1)(µ− 0.5σ2 + σδi + (1− γ)σ2)
which means that the long run return in the homogeneous economies increases
with δi if only if γ > 1. In this case we also have that the long run return in the
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homogeneous economy goes to infinity when δi goes to infinity. Consequently,
for γ > 1, we have that the long run return is higher than the long run return
in the homogeneous economy populated by agent A∗ with δA∗ = σ2((γ−1)σ+
1) > 0. The long run return in our economy corresponds then to the long
return in an homogeneous economy populated by an agent B with δB ≥ δA > 0
and such that
lim inf
T→∞
(T − t)−1 log R(t, T ) = µ+ ρ+ (γ− 1)(µ− 0.5σ2 +σδB + (1− γ)σ2).
In conclusion, in our economy we have that the long run return is determined
by the agent with δ = δB > 0 while the asymptotic long run discount rate is
determined by the agent with δ = δmin < 0 and the asymptotic short rate,
volatility and stock price are determined by the agent with δ = 0 which is the
only surviving agent.
8.3 Optimal Portfolios
Let us consider the investment strategy of agent i in the risky and in the
riskless aset that permits to implement the equilibrium consumption process
(cit). Such a strategy is characterized by a process piit that corresponds to
the number of shares of the risky asset held at date t by the agent under
consideration. The number of shares of riskless asset is determined by the
dynamic budget constraint and if we denote by wit the financial wealth of
agent i at date t along this strategy, we have
dwit = wit(rtdt+ pii t(S
−1
t (dSt +Dtdt)− rtdt))− citdt (11)
= wit(rt dt+ pii tσt(θtdt+ dBt))− citdt. (12)
In the next, we denote by pimyopicit the myopic (instantaneously mean vari-
ance efficient) portfolio given by
pimyopicit =
δi + θt
γiσt
and we denote by pihedgingit = piit − pimyopicit the hedging component of the
optimal portfolio, i.e. the component that permits to hedge against future
fluctuations of the market risk premium.
The following proposition characterizes the optimal portfolio and provides
its asymptotic composition.
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Proposition 8.3 1. The optimal portfolio is given by
σtpiit = θt +
Et
[∫∞
t
(biδi + (bi − 1)θτ )Mτciτdτ
]
Et
[∫∞
t
Mτciτdτ
]
In particular,
min
j
θj + min
j
(biδi + (bi− 1)θj) ≤ σtpiit ≤ max
j
θj + max
j
(biδi + (bi− 1)θj)
2. If we further assume that γi > 1, for all i, then
lim
t→∞
piit =
δi + θIK
σγi
.
3. Suppose risk aversion is homogeneous. The sign of (1− b) pihedgingit
• is positive if the sequences
bσδi +
1
2
b(1− b)δ2i + bρi − 2b2(max
j
θj + δi)δi , (13)
bσ δi +
1
2
b(1− b)δ2i + bρi − 2b2(min
j
θj + δi)δi (14)
are both anti-co-monotone with (δi);
• is negative if the sequences (13)-(14) are both co-monotone with
(δi).
The asymptotic risky portfolio corresponds then, for each agent, to his
optimal risky portfolio when facing an asset whose risk premium corresponds
to the asymptotic risk premium of our heterogeneous economy, that is to say
the risk premium that would prevail in the economy populated by agent IK
only.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1
Immediate.
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Proof of Lemma 4.1
Let
bi = 1/γi
denote the relative risk tolerance. The optimal consumption of investor i is
given by
cit = e
−ρibitM−bit Z
bi
it ci0 = (c
γi
i0Mit)
bi DtM
−bi
t .
In equilibrium we require that
n∑
i=1
cit = Dt
or equivalently ∑
i
(cγii0Mit)
biM−bit = 1.
Let F (a1, · · · , an) be the function defined as the unique solution to∑
i
F−biabii = 1. (15)
Then, a direct consequence of the equilibrium equation is that
M = F (cγ110M1, · · · , cγ1N0MN).
Let Γ ≥ 1 be such that Γbi > 1 for all i and γ ≤ 1 be such that γ bi ≤ 1
for all i . We have
∑
i (c
γi
i0Mit)
biM−bit = 1 which gives (c
γi
i0Mit)M
−1
t ≤ 1 and∑
i
(cγii0Mit)
1
Γ M
− 1
Γ
t ≥ 1 ≥
∑
i
(cγii0Mit)
1
γ M
− 1
γ
t .
The bounds on Mt follow from there.
Proof of Corollary 4.1
The first part is immediate. Note that F (a1, · · · , aN) > F (a′1, · · · , a′N)
whenever ai > a
′
i for i = 1, · · ·N. The state price density Mt is then decreas-
ing in Wt whenever all the state price densities Mit are decreasing in Wt for
i = 1, · · ·N. The asymptotic results are immediate.
Proof of Corollary 5.1
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By Lemma 4.1, Mt ≥ cγIKIK0 e−ρIK tZIKtD
−γIK
t . Therefore, for i 6= IK
citD
−1
t = e
−ρibitM−bit Z
bi
it ci0 ≤ e−ρibit
(
c
γIK
IK0
e−ρIK tZIKtD
−γIK
t
)−bi
Zbiit ci0 D
−1
t
=
(
e−ρitcγii0Zit
e−ρIK tc
γIK
IK0
ZIKt
D
γIK−γi
t
)bi
= ebi(κIK−κi)t+bi(γj−γi)σWt . (16)
By definition, κIK −κi < 0 and therefore citD−1t converges to zero by the law
of large numbers. Since
∑
i ci = D, we have limt→∞ cIKtD
−1
t = 1. The limits
when Wt goes to +∞ or −∞ result directly from Corollary 4.1. Finally, we
have ωit = c
γi
i0MiF
−1Fai and then
dωit(Wt)
dWt
= cγii0
dMit
dWt
F−1Fai − cγii0MiF−2Fai
∑
j
Fajc
γj
j0
dMjt
dWt
+ cγii0MiF
−1∑
j
Faiajc
γj
j0
dMjt
dWt
. (17)
If we differentiate the formula∑
k
F 1−bkabkk − F = 0
with respect to ai and then with respect to aj, we get
Faiaj = ((1− bj) + (1− bi))ωitωjtMt(cγii0Mitcγjj0Mjt)−1
−M−1t
∑
k
(1− bk)ωktFaiFaj + δij(bi − 1)(cγii0Mit)−2Mtωit (18)
where δij is equal to 1 for i = j and to 0 for i 6= j. Replacing in (17) and
recombining the different terms leads to
dωit(Wt)
dWt
= ωit
[
bi(θt − θi)−
∑
j
ωjtbj(θt − θj)
]
. (19)
Proof of Proposition 6.1
Assume that M can be written in the representation
dMt = Mt(−rtdt− θtdWt).
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The risk free rate is then given by rt and the market price of risk is given by
θt. Since
Mt = F (c
γ1
10M1t, · · · , cγNN0MNt)
we have,
dMt =
∑
i
cγii0FaidMit +
1
2
∑
i , j
cγii0c
γj
j0Faiajd〈Mit,Mjt〉. (20)
By definition,
dMit = Mit (−ridt− θidWt) (21)
and the formula
θt =
N∑
i=1
ωitθi,
follows directly. As far as the risk free rate is concerned, we have
d〈Mit,Mjt〉 = MitMjtθiθjdt. (22)
which with (18) leads to
rt =
N∑
i=1
ωitri −
(
N∑
i=1
θiωit
)(
N∑
j=1
θj (1− bj)ωjt
)
+
1
2
(
N∑
k=1
(1− bk)ωkt
)(
N∑
i=1
θiωit
)2
+
1
2
N∑
i=1
(1− bi) θ2iωit.
Proof of Corollary 6.1
The first point is immediate.
Using the inequality
a2 + b2 ≥ 2ab,
we get
1
2
(∑
k
|1− bk|ωkt
)(∑
i
θiωit
)2
+
1
2
∑
i
|1− bi| θ2iωit
≥
(∑
k
|1− bk|ωkt
)1/2(∑
i
θiωit
)(∑
i
|1− bi| θ2iωit
)1/2
. (23)
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Now, applying the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality(∑
i
x2i
)1/2(∑
i
y2i
)1/2
≥
∑
i
xiyi
to
xi = |1− bi|1/2 θiω1/2it and yi = |1− bi|1/2 ω1/2it
we get the first or the second inequality depending on the sign of the (1− bi)
s. The limits are obtained from the behavior of the ωi s in extreme states of
the world.
The asymptotic results are immediate from Corollary 5.1.
Proof of Corollary 6.2
We have,
ωit = c
γi
i0MitF
−1Fai
and therefore
dωit(Wt)
dWt
= cγii0
(
dMit
dWt
F−1Fai −MitF−2Fai
∑
j
c
γj
j0Faj
dMjt
dWt
+MitF
−1∑
j
c
γj
j0Faiaj
dMjt
dWt
)
= −ωitbiθi+ωitθt−ωit
∑
j
ωjt (1−bj)θj−ωit(1−bi)θt+ωitθt
∑
k
(1−bk)ωkt .
(24)
After some manipulations, we get
dθt
dWt
=
∑
i
θi
dωit
dWt
= −
∑
i
ωitb
2
i θ
2
i + θ
2
t − 2θt
∑
i
ωit(1− bi)θi + θ2t
∑
k
(1− bk)ωkt
= 2
(∑
j
ωjtθj
)(∑
j
ωjtbjθj
)
−
(∑
j
ωjtθ
2
j
)(∑
j
ωjtbj
)
−
∑
j
ωjtbjθ
2
j .
Now, applying Cauchy-Schwarz, we get(∑
j
ωjtbjθ
2
j
)(∑
j
ωjtbj
)
≥
(∑
j
ωjtbjθj
)2
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and ∑
j
ωjtθ
2
j ≥
(∑
j
ωjtθj
)2
and therefore(∑
j
ωjtθ
2
j
)(∑
j
ωjtbj
)
+
∑
j
ωjtbjθ
2
j
≥ 2
((∑
j
ωjtθ
2
j
)(∑
j
ωjtbj
)(∑
j
ωjtbjθ
2
j
))1/2
≥ 2
(∑
j
ωjtθj
)(∑
j
ωjtbjθj
)
which is what had to be proved.
Proof of Corollary 6.3
drt
dWt
=
d
dWt
[∑
i
ωiri − θt
(∑
j
θj(1− bj)ωjt
)
+
1
2
(∑
k
(1− bk)ωkt
)
θ2t
+
1
2
∑
i
(1− bi)θ2iωi t
]
(25)
Given X = (x1, . . . , xN), denote
E(x) =
∑
i
ωitxi
Since the weights sum up to one, this is an expectation on {1, · · · , n} and
we can also define Covω and Varω. Let
R = (ri)i=1,··· ,N , β = (bi)i=1,··· ,N and Θ = (θi)i=1,··· ,N .
Then, a direct but tedious calculation implies that
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drt
dWt
= −Covω(βΘ , R) + E(Θ) Covω(β,R)
+ E(Θ)Covω(βΘ,Θ)−E(Θ)Var(βΘ)−E(Θ)2Covω(Θ, β)+E(Θ)2Covω(Θβ, β)
+
1
2
E(Θ)2
(
Covω(Θβ, β)− E(Θ) Varω(β)
)
+
1
2
(
Covω(β (β − 1)Θ2,Θ) + Covω(Θ, β) E((1− β)Θ2)
+ Covω(β,Θ)
(
2E(Θ)E(βΘ)− E(Θ2)E(β)− E(βΘ2)
)
In particular, if risk aversion is homogeneous (that is, β = (b, · · · , b))
then we get
drt
dWt
= −bCovω(Θ, R) + b(b− 1)1
2
Covω(Θ
2,Θ)
= −Covω(−bσ(δi) + 0.5b(b− 1)(δ2i )− bρi, (δi)) (26)
and the claim follows.
Proof of Proposition 7.1
We have Et [MiT ] = exp(−ri(T − t) − κit − θiWt). From (4) we obtain
limT→∞ 1T lnEt [MT ] = rI0 and since B(t, T ) =
1
Mt
Et [MT ], we get
lim
T→∞
Y (t, T ) = rI0 .
Proof of Proposition 7.2
For λ ∈ (λj−1, λj) and t = λT we have
lim
T→∞
Et[MiT ]
Et[MIjT ]
→ 0
for i 6= Ij. The asymptotic behavior of Et[Mαt] for α ∈
(
1
λj+1
, 1
λj
)
derives
directly from there and from Equation (4). By definition, B(t, T ) is equal to
1
Mt
Et [MT ] which gives the asymptotic behavior of B(t, αt).
Since Bt
t
converges to 0 almost surely we have, for α ∈ ( 1
λj
, 1
λj−1
),
lim
t→∞
Y (t, αt) =
1
α− 1[κIK − αlIj (1/α)]
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and the asymptotic instantaneous forward rate at date αt seen from date t
is given by rIj .
As far as the uniform convergence is concerned, note that
d
dα
Y (t, αt) =
t
(αt− t)2 lnB(t, αt)−
1
αt− t
d
dα
B(t, αt)
B(t, αt)
.
Let P˜ be the equivalent martingale measure, corresponding to Mt. We have
B(t, αt) = EP˜t
[
exp− ∫ αt
t
rsds
]
and d
dα
B(t, αt) = EP˜t
[
−trαt exp−
∫ αt
t
rsds
]
.
If we denote by Qt the probability defined by its density
dQt
dP˜
=
exp− R αtt rsds
E[exp−
R αt
t rsds]
then we have d
dα
Y (t, αt) = 1
(α−1)
(
−Y (t, α) + EQtt [rαt]
)
.
We also have(∑
i
c
γi/γ
i0
) 1
γ
exp
[
(αt− t) min
i
li(0)
]
≤ B(t, αt) ≤
(∑
i
c
γi/Γ
i0
) 1
Γ
exp
[
(αt− t) max
i
li(0)
]
1
t− αt
1
γ
ln
(∑
i
c
γi/γ
i0
)
−max
i
li(0)
≤ Y (t, αt) ≤ 1
t− αt
1
Γ
ln
(∑
i
c
γi/Γ
i0
)
−min
i
li(0)
which gives us that 1
α−1Y (t, αt) is bounded on the compact subsets of (1,∞) .
Using the expression for rt given by Proposition 6.1 we also have that rαt
and hence 1
α−1E
Qt
t [rαt] are bounded on the compact subsets of (1,∞) . The
mappings α→ Y (t, αt) are then uniformy Lipschitz on the compact subsets
of (1,∞) and the convergence of Y (t, αt) to Y (α) is then uniform on the
compact subsets of (1,∞) .
Proof of Proposition 8.1
1. We can rewrite the defining identity for the stock price as∫ t
0
MτDτdτ + StMt = Et
[∫ ∞
0
MτDτdτ
]
.
Thus,
MtDtdt+ d(StMt) = γtdBt
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for an adapted process γt given by
γt = Et
[∫ ∞
t
Dt (MτDτ ) dτ
]
where D denotes Malliavin derivatives. Using Ito’s formula, we get
γt = StMt(−θt + σSt ).
Let us now calculate γt. We have
Dt(MτDτ ) = Dt(Mτ )Dτ +MτσDτ
and
Dt(Mτ ) = Dt(F (cγ110M1τ , · · · , cγNN0MNτ )) =
∑
i
cγ1i0FaiDt(Miτ ) = −Mτθτ .
Thus,
γt = Et
[∫ ∞
t
(σ − θτ )MτDτdτ
]
which gives σSt . The derivation of the upper and lower bounds is straightfor-
ward.
2. Since
θt =
∑
i
ωi tθi,
we get
Et[θt+uMt+uDt+u]
Et[Mt+uDt+u]
− θIK =
∑
i6=IK
θi
Et[ωi t+uMt+uDt+u]
Et[Mt+uDt+u]
.
By (16), we get
ωi,t+u ≤ bi
mini bi
ci t+uD
−1
t+u ≤ e−ψi(t+u)+ηiWt+u (27)
for some ψi > 0. Now, the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 7.2
(based on Lemma 4.1) implies that
lim
t→∞
Et[e
−ψi(t+u)+ηiWt+uMt+uDt+u]
Et[e−ψi(t+u)+ηiWt+uM
IK
t+uDt+u]
= 1
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and from the law of large numbers we have
lim
t→∞
Et[e
−ψi(t+u)+ηiWt+uMt+uDt+u]
Et[Mt+uDt+u]
= 0
for all i 6= IK . With (27), this leads to
Et[θt+uMt+uDt+u]
Et[Mt+uDt+u]
→ θIK . (28)
and then to
lim
t→∞
σSt = σ.
3. We have
St
Dt
= Et
[∫ ∞
t
MτDτ
MtDt
dτ
]
.
Note we can rewrite the aggregate consumption condition as
1 =
N∑
i=1
(
Mτ
Mt
)−bi (Miτ
Mit
)bi
(citD
−1
t ) (29)
Then, the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 4.1 gives us(∑
i
(
(citD
−1
t )
γi
Miτ
Mit
)1/γ)γ
≤ Mτ
Mt
≤
(∑
i
(
(citD
−1
t )
γi
Miτ
Mit
)1/Γ)Γ
(30)
for Γ ≥ 1 such that Γ bi > 1 for all i and for γ ≤ 1 such that γ bi ≤ 1 for all
i. Similarly, we have(∑
i
(
(citD
−1
t )
γiEt
[
DτMiτ
DtMit
])1/γ)γ
≤ Et
[
DτMτ
DtMt
]
≤
(∑
i
(
(citD
−1
t )
γiEt
[
DτMiτ
DtMit
])1/Γ)Γ
(31)
Since all finite dimensional norms are equivalent, there exist constants K1 >
K2 > 0 such that
K2
∑
i
(citD
−1
t )
γiEt
[
DτMiτ
DtMit
]
≤ Et
[
DτMτ
DtMt
]
≤ K1
∑
i
(citD
−1
t )
γiEt
[
DτMiτ
DtMit
]
.
(32)
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Pick now an  > 0 and let T > 0 be so large that∑
i
(
S
D
)
i
e−T(
S
D )
−1
i < 
then by (32) we have
Et
[∫ ∞
t+T
MτDτ
MtDt
dτ
]
≤ K1
for all t > 0. Now, the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 7.2
implies that, for any θ > 0,
Et
[
Dt+θMt+θ
DtMt
]
→ e−θ(
S
D )
−1
IK .
Consequently, because of uniform boundedness, guaranteed by (32), we can
interchange limit and integration and we have
Et
[∫ T
0
Dt+θMt+θ
DtMt
dθ
]
→
∫ T
0
e
−θ( SD )
−1
IK dθ.
Since  > 0 is arbitrary and T can be made arbitrarily large, we are done.
4. After some algebraic manipulations, we have
St
Dt
= Et
[∫ +∞
t
e−
R t
0 ζsds
Nt+τ
Nt
dτ
]
where
ζt = rt + θtσ − µ
is the risk-adjusted discount rate and
Nt = e
−0.5 R t0 (θs−σ)2ds−R t0 (θs−σ)dWs
is an exponential martingale. Thus, Nt is a density process of a measure dν
and, under this measure, we can rewrite
St
Dt
= Eνt
[∫ +∞
t
e−
R τ
t ζsdsdτ
]
.
Lemma 1 in Mele (2007) implies that St
Dt
is procyclical (countercyclical) if
and only if ζt is countercyclical (procyclical).
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Furthermore, if g is such that
St
Dt
= g(t,Wt)
then, by the Ito formula,
σSt = σ +
∂g/∂Wt
g
and hence excess volatility is positive if and only if g is monotone increasing.
Thus, we need to check cyclicality of the risk-adjusted discount rate ζt.
We have
∂ζt
∂Wt
=
∂rt
∂Wt
+
∂θt
∂Wt
σ
We have
∂θt
∂Wt
= −2bVarωi(δi)
and hence we need that
Covωi(bσδi + 0.5b(1− b)δ2i + bρi, δi)− 2bσ Varωi(δi)
= Covωi(0.5b(1− b)δ2i + bρi − bσδi, δi). (33)
Proof of Proposition 8.2
Introduce a new measure dP (α) such that its restriction on FT is given by
dP
(α)
T =
DαT
E[DαT ]
dPT
where PT is the physical measure. Under the measure dP
(α), Wt has drift
σα, dWt = dW
(α)
t + σ
2αdt, and Dt has a drift µ + σ
2α. By the Kolmogorov
extension theorem, we can extend this measure to the set of infinite paths.
Then, we can rewrite the expression for R(t, T ) as
R(t, T ) =
Et[DT ]
Dt
Dt
St
E
(1)
t
[
ST
DT
e
R T
t DsS
−1
s ds
]
(34)
By (32) we have,
L2 ≡ K2 n−maxi γi min
i
Si ≤ St
Dt
≤ K1
∑
i
Si ≡ L1.
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Consequently, St/Dt is uniformly bounded both from zero and infinity and
hence
µ +
(
log(L2/L1) + logE
(1)
t
[
e
R T
t DsS
−1
s ds
] )
≤ lim inf
T→∞
(T − t)−1 log R(t, T )
≤ µ + (T − t)−1
(
log(L1/L2) + logE
(1)
t
[
e
R T
t DsS
−1
s ds
] )
(35)
and hence
µ + lim inf
T→∞
(T − t)−1 logE(1)t
[
e
R T
t DsS
−1
s ds
]
≤ lim inf
T→∞
(T − t)−1 log R(t, T ) ≤ lim sup
T→∞
(T − t)−1 log R(t, T )
≤ µ + lim sup
T→∞
(T − t)−1 logE(1)t
[
e
R T
t DsS
−1
s ds
]
. (36)
The optimal consumption of agent i can be rewritten as
cit = e
−ρ(α)i bitM−bit (Z
(α)
it )
bici0
where
ρ
(α)
i = ρi − δiσ2α and Z(α)it = eδiW
(α)
t − 12 δ2i t.
Thus, under this new measure everything looks the same, apart from the fact
that agents have different discount rates. Note that the stock price is still
calculated under the original, physical measure, but we can rewrite it as
St
Dt
=
1
MtDt
Et
[∫ ∞
t
MτDτdτ
]
=
1
MtDt
∫ ∞
t
Et[D
α
τ ]
Et [Mτ D
1−α
τ D
α
t ]
Et[Dατ ]
dτ
=
1
MtDt
∫ ∞
t
Et[D
α
τ ]E
(α)
t
[
Mτ D
1−α
τ
]
dτ (37)
We define agent A(α) as (being the analog of agent IK)
(ρ
(α)
A +γA(µ+σ
2α−0.5σ2)+0.5δ2A) = min
i
(ρ
(α)
i +γi(µ+σ
2α−0.5σ2)+0.5δ2i )
(38)
By Corollary 4.1, under the measure P (α), we have
Mt ∼ cγA(α)IK 0 e−ρA(α) tZA(α) tD
−γA(α)
t .
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Similarly, in complete analogy with the proof of Proposition 8.1,
E
(α)
t
[
Mt+uD
1−α
t+u
] ∼ E(α)t [M (α)t+uD1−αt+u ]
under P (α) and we obtain that
lim
t→∞
St
Dt
= SA(α) P
(α) − a.s.
by the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 8.1.
Now, Jensen’s inequality implies
logEt
[
ST e
R T
t DsS
−1
s ds
]
= logEt[D
α
T ] + log
Et
[
DαT D
−α
T ST e
R T
t DsS
−1
s ds
]
Et[DαT ]
= logEt[D
α
T ] + log E
α
t
[(
D1−αT
ST
DT
e
R T
t DsS
−1
s ds
)]
≥ Eαt [log(ST/DT )] +
∫ T
t
E
(α)
t [(Ds/Ss)] ds + E
(α)
t [log(D
1−α
T )]+logEt[D
α
T ]
(39)
We have
logEt[D
α
T ] = Et[e
α((µ−0.5σ2)T+σWT )]
= log
(
eσ αWt e0.5(1−λ)T α
2σ2 +T α(µ−0.5σ2)
)
= σ αWt + T α
(
µ+ 0.5σ2((1− λ)α− 1)) (40)
and
E
(α)
t [log(D
1−α
T )] = E
α
t [log(e
(1−α) ((µ+(α−0.5)σ2)T+σW (α)T )]
= (1− α) ((µ+ (α− 0.5)σ2)T + (1− α)σ (Wt − σ2αλT ) (41)
Since ST/DT converges to SA(α) P
(α)−almost surely, a slight modification of
the proof of Proposition 8.1 implies that in fact
lim
T→∞
(1− λ)−1 T−1
∫ T
λT
E
(α)
λT [(Ds/Ss)]ds = S
−1
A(α)
and
lim
→∞
T−1 Eαt [log(ST/DT )] = 0.
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and, by the law of large numbers,
lim
T→∞
T−1 logSt = lim
T→∞
logDt = λ (µ− 0.5σ2).
Hence,
lim inf
T→∞
T−1 log R(t, T ) ≥ −λ (µ− 0.5σ2)
+ α
(
µ+0.5σ2((1−λ)α−1)) + (1−α) ((µ+(α−0.5)σ2) + (1−λ)S−1A(α)
(42)
Proof of Proposition 8.3
1. By the budget constraint, the wealth is given by the present value of
future consumption, that is
Mtwit = Et
[∫ ∞
t
Mτciτdτ
]
= ci0Et
[∫ ∞
t
e−ρibiτM1−biτ e
bi(δiWτ− 12 δ2i τ)dτ
]
.
Similarly to what we did with the stock price (Proof of Proposition (8.1), we
get that ∫ t
0
Mτciτdτ +Mtwit = Et
[∫ ∞
0
Mτciτdτ
]
is a martingale and hence
Mtcitdt+ witdMt +Mtdwit + d〈Mt, wit〉 = γtdWt
where, by the Clark-Ocone formula,
γt = Et [Dt(Mτciτ )dτ ] .
By the Ito’s formula,
γt = witMt(−θt + σtpiit)
Now, by the rules for Malliavin derivatives,
Dt(Mτciτ ) = Dt
(
e−ρibiτM1−biτ e
bi(δiWτ− 12 δ2i τ)
)
= (1− bi)e−ρibiτM−biτ Dt(Mτ )ebi(δiWτ−
1
2
δ2i τ) + e−ρibiτM1−biτ biδie
bi(δiWτ− 12 δ2i τ)
= −(1− bi)e−ρib τM−biτ θτMτebi(δiWτ−
1
2
δ2i τ) + e−ρibiτM1−biτ biδie
bi(δiWτ− 12 δ2i τ)
= (biδi + (bi − 1)θτ )Mτciτ (43)
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Thus,
γt = Et
[∫ ∞
t
(biδi + (bi − 1)θτ )Mτciτdτ
]
and we get
σtpiit = θt +
Et
[ ∫∞
t
(biδi + (bi − 1)θτ )Mτciτdτ
]
Et
[∫∞
t
Mτciτdτ
] .
2. Suppose now that γi > 1. Let Γ ≥ 1 be such that Γ bj/(1 − bi) > 1
for all j and γ ≤ 1 be such that γ bj/(1 − bi) ≤ 1 for all j . Then, the same
argument as in the proof of Lemma 4.1 gives us(∑
j
(
c
γj(1−bi)
j0 Et[e
−ρj(1−bi)TZ1−bijT Z
bi
iTD
−γj(1−bi)
T ]
)1/γ )γ
≤ Et[M1−biT ZbiiT ]
≤
(∑
j
(
c
γj(1−bi)
j0 Et[e
−ρj(1−bi)TZ1−bijT Z
bi
iTD
−γj(1−bi)
T ]
)1/Γ)Γ
. (44)
Denote
c
(IK)
it = e
−ρi bi τ (M (IK)τ )
−bi Zbiit .
Note that
Et[M
(IK)
t+u c
IK
i t+u]
M
(IK)
t c
(IK)
i t
= e−(ρi bi+ρIK (1−bi))uEt
((Dt+u
Dt
)−γIK ZIK t+u
ZIK t
)1−bi (
Zi t+u
Zi t
)bi (45)
is independent of t.
By Lemma 4.1, we have
Mt ci t ∼ M (IK)t c(IK)i t .
and a direct application of (44) and the same argument as in the proof of
Proposition 7.2 implies that
Et[Mt+u ci t+u] ∼ Et[M (IK)t+u c(IK)i t+u].
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By the same argument as in the proof of (28) (but based on the bounds of
44), we get that
lim
t→∞
Et[ωj t+uD
−1
t+uMt+u ci t+u]
Et[Mt+u ci t+u]
→ 0
and in complete analogy with the proof of (28), we obtain
Et[θt+uMt+uci t+u] ∼ θ(IK)Et[Mt+uci t+u].
and from there
lim
t→∞
Et[θt+uMt+uci t+u]
Mt ci t
= θ(IK)
Et[M
(IK)
t+u c
(IK)
i t+u]
M
(IK)
t c
(IK)
i t
and
lim
t→∞
Et[Mt+u ci t+u]
Mt ci t
=
Et[M
(IK)
t+u c
(IK)
i t+u]
M
(IK)
t c
(IK)
i t
.
Now, let us prove that
lim
t→∞
∫ ∞
0
Et[θt+uMt+u ci t+u]
Mt ci t
du = θ(IK)
∫ ∞
0
Et[Mt+u c
(IK)
i t+u]
Mt c
(IK)
i t
du
and
lim
t→∞
Wit
cit
= lim
t→∞
∫ ∞
0
Et[Mt+u ci t+u]
Mt ci t
du =
∫ ∞
0
Et[Mt+u c
(IK)
i t+u]
Mt c
(IK)
i t
du
By the Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem, it suffices to show that
there exists a integrable function g(u) such that
Et[Mt+u ci t+u]
Mt ci t
= Et
[(
Mt+u
Mt
)1−bi (
e−ρ u
Zi t+u
Zit
)bi]
≤ g(u).
By (30) and using the fact that for α > 0, there exists a constant K > 0
such that (∑
i
xi
)α
≤ K
∑
i
xαi ,
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we have(
Mτ
Mt
)1−bi (
e−ρi(τ−t)
Zi τ
Zit
)bi
≤ K
∑
j
e−ρj(τ−t)(1−bi)
(
Zjτ
Zjt
(
Dτ
Dt
)−γj)1−bi (
e−ρi(τ−t)
Zi τ
Zit
)bi
. (46)
Now, using the Young inequality
x1−biybi ≤ (1− bi)x+ biy
we get that
e−ρj(τ−t)(1−bi)
(
Zjτ
Zjt
(
Dτ
Dt
)−γj)1−bi (
e−ρi(τ−t)
Zi τ
Zit
)bi
=
e−ρj(τ−t)(Zjτ
Zjt
(
Dτ
Dt
)1−γj)1−bi (
e−ρi (τ−t)
Zi τ
Zit
(
Dτ
Dt
)1−γi)bi
≤ K
(
e−ρi (τ−t)
Zi τ
Zit
(
Dτ
Dt
)1−γi
+ e−ρj(τ−t)
Zjτ
Zjt
(
Dτ
Dt
)1−γj)
(47)
and hence
Et[Mt+u ci t+u]
Mt ci t
≤ K
∑
j
e−uS
−1
i
which is integrable by the assumption that Si > 0. As a direct consequence,
we have
lim
t→∞
piit =
δi + θ
(IK)
σ γi
.
3. We define
f(t,Wt) = Et
[∫ ∞
t
e−ρibi(τ−t)
Zbiiτ M
1−bi
τ
Zbiit M
1−bi
t
]
.
Then, the wealth wit of agent i satisfies
wit = Z
bi
itM
−bi
t e
−ρtf(t,Wt).
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An applucation of Ito’s formula implies that
piitσt = δibi + θtbi +
(d/dWt)f(t,Wt)
f(t,Wt)
and hence
pihedgingit = σ
−1
t
(d/dWt)f(t,Wt)
f(t,Wt)
.
To determine the sign of the hedging portfolio, we need to check whether f
is monotone increasing.
We have
Et
[∫ ∞
t
e−ρibi(τ−t)
Zbiiτ M
1−bi
τ
Zbiit M
1−bi
t
]
= Et
[
e−ρibi(τ−t)− 0.5 bi δ
2
i (τ−t)+δibi(Wτ−Wt)−(1−bi)
R τ
t (rs+0.5θ
2
s)ds+
R τ
t (δibi+(bi−1)θs)dWs
]
= EPit
[∫ ∞
t
e−
R τ
t ζisds dτ
]
(48)
where Pi is a new measure with density process
dPi
dP
= e−
R t
0 (δibi+(bi−1)θs)2ds+
R τ
t (δibi+(bi−1)θs)dWs
and
ζit = ρibi + 0.5biδ
2
i + (1− bi)rt + 0.5(1− bi)θ2t − 0.5(δibi + (bi − 1)θt)2
= ρibi + 0.5bi(1− bi)δ2i + (1− bi)rt + 0.5(1− bi)bi θ2t + δibi(1− bi)θt (49)
Thus, it all reduces to checking monotonicity of
ζi(Wt) = rt +
1
2
biθ
2
t + δibiθt
Suppose that risk aversion is homogeneous. Then, the derivative of ζi is given
by
Covωi(bσδi +
1
2
b(1− b)δ2i + bρi, δi)− 2b2(θt + δi) Varωi(δi)
Thus, we get the result (using the fact that θt ∈ [minj θj,maxj θj]).
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